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ABSTRACT 
 
 We propose a two-region two-sector model of uneven development, 
where technological change benefits either the lagging or the leading region. In 
this framework inter-regional transfers may lead to persistent 
underdevelopment; by raising wages, transfers reduce the chance of the 
backward region adopting a new technology and taking o.. Due to uncertainty 
about which region benefits from technological change, the backward region 
may rationally choose to remain underdeveloped, while the advanced region 
continues to pay transfers. The model provides a rationale for cases, such as 
Italy’s Mezzogiorno, where the same rich region subsidizes the same poor 
region on a continuous basis.  
  
JEL classification: R58, H7. 
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I Introduction
Interregional transfers that raise wages without improving productivity have often been
blamed for keeping backward regions trapped into underdevelopment. By eroding the
competitiveness of lagging regions, such transfers contribute to their inability to take off.
The standard textbook example is Italy, where the post-war convergence of the Mezzogiorno
went into reverse at the beginning of the 1970s (Paci and Sabo, 1998), when public policy
shifted from investment incentives to income support (Boltho, Carlino and Scaramazzino,
1997). As a result, between 1971 and 1990 unit labor costs in the South rose 23% more
than in the North, while its relative GDP per capita declined from 0.65 to 0.57. Post-
reunification Germany tells much the same story. Heavy subsidies and union wage setting
resulted in a ten-fold jump in relative Eastern wages – from 7% in 1991 to 70% in 1998 –
with relative labor productivity only increasing from 35% to 55% (Sinn, 2000). Not before
long, the new Länder had earned the dubious distinction of being called the Mezzogiorno
on the Elbe. A similar picture emerges from a European wide study by Padoa Schioppa
and Basile (2002). They find that peripheral countries, such as Spain or Ireland, have been
catching up faster than peripheral regions, such as Southern Italy or Eastern Germany.
Padoa Schioppa et al. (2002) point to an already familiar culprit: national unions constrain
wages to be the same across regions within countries. As this leads to higher unemployment
in peripheral regions, union wages increase the demand for interregional transfers, keeping
peripheral regions from taking off.1 Since unions do not have the same power to set uniform
wages across countries, peripheral countries do not undergo the same fate.
Transfers that lock backward regions into underdevelopment seem hard to make
sense of. Why would the South be willing to accept transfers if they imply giving up the
possibility of taking off? And why would the North want to pump money into a bottomless
well? The contribution of this paper is to show how such transfers can be rationalized.
That transfers may have a negative impact on the backward region’s development is well
known; how they can be sustained in equilibrium is not.
1 In the case of Italy regional differentials in collective labor contracts ceased to be allowed at the end of
the 1960s. Several authors have blamed the lackluster behavior of the Mezzogiorno on this policy change
(Faini, 1993; Brunello, Lupi and Ordine, 2001).
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To analyze this issue, we propose a two-period model of uneven regional develop-
ment inspired by Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) and Desmet (2002). In the first
period the economy is divided into a rich manufacturing North and a poor agricultural
South. In the second period we introduce a new manufacturing technology, which can
either locate in the backward South – attracted by its low wages – or in the advanced
North – if spillovers from the previous technology are sufficiently strong to compensate
for the higher wages. Inter-regional transfers raise wages in the backward region, reducing
its chance to adopt the new technology and take off. With high enough transfers, the
backward South never adopts the new technology, and is doomed to remain backward.
The main result of the paper is that transfers condemning the backward region to
underdevelopment may Pareto dominate (lower) transfers that give the backward region a
chance to take off. This is what we call rational underdevelopment. The advanced region
gives transfers to protect itself against low-wage competition, thus keeping the backward
region from taking off and ensuring its dominant position; the backward region accepts
those transfers – and rationally chooses to remain backward – because even without
transfers it is not sure to benefit from the new technology. To illustrate our theoretical
findings, we provide some numerical examples, and show that rational underdevelopment
is consistent with reasonable parameter values. Our motivating examples and our focus are
on the effects of transfers between regions within developed countries, and not on transfers
between rich and poor countries.
Our paper is related to the well known transfer paradox, dating back to Leontieff
(1936). This paradox refers to the possibility of transfers benefiting the donor through
an improvement in its terms of trade. If the gains from more favorable terms of trade
are enough to compensate the losses from paying transfers, the donor ends up better off.
Although this suffices to show why rich regions or countries may be interested in paying
transfers, it falls short in explaining why their poor counterparts are willing to accept them.
The same failure to endogenize transfers afflicts Desmet (2002). That paper limits
itself to showing how transfers can make backward regions worse off; it remains silent on
whether such policies could be sustained in equilibrium. This is also true for the empirical
work on the Mezzogiorno and Eastern Germany (Boltho et al., 1997; Alesina, Danninger
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and Rostagno, 1999; Sinn, 2000; Sinn and Westermann, 2001). If anything, the common
tone is that these regional policies have been misplaced. Our paper claims this is not
necessarily the case.
Of course there exist models that explain why transfers arise in equilibrium. A
first class of such models argues that interregional transfers can be used to solve a fiscal
externality problem. Of particular interest is Wildasin (1994), who shows that local redis-
tributive policies in the rich region may lead to an inefficiently high level of migration. In
that case using transfers to stem migration may make everyone better off. However, unlike
in our paper, having distortionary public policy is a precondition for transfers to be Pareto
improving. A second class of models argues that transfers can be justified as a risk sharing
device against asymmetric shocks (Alesina and Perotti, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 1996a,
1996b). Asymmetric shocks imply two-way tranfers: region A is willing to subsidize region
B because at some future date B will subsidize A. This setup can therefore not explain the
Mezzogiorno problem: one-way transfers, where the same rich region subsidizes the same
poor region on a continuous basis. A third class of models claims that a rich region may
be willing to pay transfers to a poor region, because the cost of transfers is compensated
by the benefit of a more efficient provision of public goods (Bolthon and Roland, 1997).
However, none of these papers study the effect of transfers on the development prospects
of the backward regions.
Summing up, the literature that explains how transfers keep lagging regions back-
ward is unable to rationalize them (Leontieff, 1936; Desmet, 2002), whereas the literature
that rationalizes transfers does not explain how they keep lagging regions backward (Myers,
1990; Wildasin, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1996a; Bolthon and Roland, 1997). The con-
tribution of our paper is to tackle both issues simultaneously. We show how transfers that
harm a backward region’s development prospects may be rational. The North ensures it
remains in the lead, whereas the South prefers the certainty of transfers to the uncertainty
of taking off.
The motives that give rise to transfers in our model require some further justifi-
cation. Post-reunification Germany provides a good illustration of what we have in mind.
The first part of our argument says that the rich region is willing to pay transfers, because
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it is worried about low wage competition. Akerlof et al. (1991) claim that Western German
unions pushed for wage equality, because they were worried about firms moving East, and
workers moving West. They quote the journal of the German trade unions, Die Quelle, as
arguing that the absence of wage parity would drive down Western wages. They further-
more provide evidence of Western auto workers expressing their concern about worsening
conditions because of Volkswagen’s new facilities in the East. Sinn and Sinn (1992) note
that Western German capital owners were also often in favor of wage parity, as this would
protect the value of past investments in the West. They quote the chairman of the Metal
Trades Employers Association, as “vigorously” defending Eastern wage increases.
The second part of our argument says that the poor region is willing to accept
transfers, because it prefers the certainty of transfers to the uncertainty of take off. Eastern
Germans seemed happy to go along with wage parity. This was not out of ignorance.
According to a survey by Akerlof et al. (1991), a full 80 percent of Eastern Germans
understood that their wages were increasing faster than their productivity. Also, they
were aware that such policies could have detrimental effects on employment. In a poll
conducted by the Allensbach Institut in 1990, only 45 percent of East Germans thought
their firm would survive (Akerlof et al., 1991). In spite of this dismal outlook, Eastern
workers preferred wage equality. Transfers in the form of unemployment benefits provide a
convincing explanation to this apparent puzzle (Akerlof et al., 1991; Sinn and Sinn, 1992).
Since in Germany those benefits depend on terminal wages, workers may have preferred a
significant, though brief, wage increase, before becoming unemployed. This arrangement
may have benefitted Eastern Germans in two ways: it increased their income under the
bad outcome of unemployment, and it may also have raised their expected income.
A relevant question is whether there is anything that makes a region different from
a country. While our theoretical model does not differentiate between the two, the focus
is clearly on regions within countries. Indeed, the motivating examples and the numerical
exercises refer to regions. In addition, the policy instruments we have in mind, such as
wage subsidies or unemployment benefits, are more fitting of transfers between regions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model and gives conditions under which rational underdevelopment may occur; Section 3
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provides some numerical examples; and Section 4 concludes.
II The model
The basic structure of the model follows closely Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon (1993) and
Desmet (2002). Consider two regions, North and South. Variables referring to the South
are denoted by an asterisk. Labor is the only factor of production and is geographically
immobile. While criticizable in the case of the U.S., this latter assumption seems reasonable
in the European context. The size of the labor force is the same in both regions:
L = L∗ = 1
Let QF (QM) denote output of food (manufactures), and LF (LM) labor employed in food
(manufactures). Food technologies are identical in North and South :
QF = LF (1)
Q∗F = L∗F (2)
Manufacturing production, however, is subject to region-specific learning externalities, so
that manufacturing technologies differ across regions:
QM = ALM (3)
Q∗M = A∗L∗M (4)
Food and manufacturing should not be interpreted literally; they are metaphors for a sector
with no learning and a sector with learning. All consumers have identical preferences:
U(CM , CF ) = v(CµMC
1−µ
F ) (5)
where v is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function; CF and CM denote the
consumption of food and manufactures; and µ > 1/2.2 Consumers, therefore, are risk
averse, and spend a fraction µ of their income on manufactures. After normalizing the
food price to 1, the inverse demand function of manufactures relative to food is:
CM
CF
=
µ
1− µ
1
pM
(6)
2This ensures uneven development between both regions. Without this assumption, both regions would
produce food, and wages would equalize.
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where pM denotes the manufacturing price.
The model consists of two periods: in period 1 productivity differences lead the
economy to diverge into a rich manufacturing North and a poor agricultural South; in
period 2 a new manufacturing technology is introduced, which either reinforces or reverses
this pattern of uneven development. In what follows we study in turn each period.
Period 1
In period 1 the economy is fully specialized: the North produces manufactures, and the
South produces food. Plugging production into (6) gives us the equilibrium manufacturing
price:
pM =
µ
1− µ
1
A (7)
For full specialization to be an equilibrium, nobody in the South should have an incentive
to switch to manufacturing production, so that:
1 > µ
1− µ
A∗
A (8)
In other words, the productivity advantage of the North needs to be sufficiently large
compared to the relative importance of manufacturing consumption, so that the North
is able to satisfy on its own all of the economy’s manufacturing demand. Likewise, no
workers in the North should have an incentive to switch to food; this result is immediate,
since µ > 1/2. Given the manufacturing price (7), relative wages are:
w
w∗ =
µ
1− µ (9)
The economy is therefore divided into a rich manufacturing North and a poor agricultural
South. There is a Dutch disease flavor to this story. By having comparative advantage
in food, the South gets stuck in agricultural production, and by doing so gives up future
productivity gains in manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1992; Krugman, 1987).
The central government now reduces regional inequality by limiting the rich re-
gion’s relative wage to α, where 1 ≤ α ≤ µ1−µ ; the smaller α, the greater the degree of
redistribution. The value of α is decided at the beginning of the first period, and lasts until
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the end of the second period. In a two-period model – unlike in an infinite horizon model
– such a policy is time-inconsistent: the rich region has no incentive to subsidize the poor
region in the second period. This problem would disappear in an infinite horizon model.3
Inter-regional redistribution is implemented by taxing manufacturing workers in
the rich region, and subsidizing food workers in the poor region. The redistribution policy
does not give an incentive to anyone to switch sectors, so that production is unaffected.
Given homothetic preferences, the relative manufacturing price does not change either.
Only wages are affected by redistribution.
Since in the first period Northern taxes subsidize Southern workers, wages drop in
the North and rise in the South:
w = pMA− t (10)
w∗ = 1+ t∗ (11)
where the tax t and the subsidy t∗ are such that:
w
w∗ = α (12)
Assuming a balanced budget, we have:
t = t∗ (13)
Using (7) and (10)-(13), we can derive wages, as a function of α, in both regions:
w = 1
1− µ
α
1 + α (14)
w∗ = 1
1− µ
1
1 + α (15)
This translates into the following utilities for North and South in period 1:
U1(α) = v(
α
1 + αA
µ) (16)
U∗1 (α) = v(
1
1 + αA
µ) (17)
Not surpringly, redistribution increases welfare in the South, and decreases welfare in the
North.
3The working paper version of the paper contains such a time-consistent infinite horizon model.
9
Higher wages make the South less attractive for new industries. Inter-regional
transfers may thus contribute to persistent underdevelopment. The next section develops
this argument in detail.
Period 2
In period 2 a new manufacturing technology is exogenously introduced. Although neither
region has any direct experience with the new technology, the North benefits from learning
spillovers coming from the old technology. These spillovers may be large or small, depending
on the similarity between the two technologies.
As can be seen in Figure 1, with probability p spillovers are large, and the North’s
productivity in the new technology is high: ah > A; with probability 1 − p spillovers are
small, and the North’s productivity in the new technology is low: al < A. Since the South
does not benefit from learning spillovers, its productivity in the new technology is in either
case below that of the North: a∗ < al < ah.
Once a region adopts the new technology, it starts accumulating experience and
moves up the new technology’s learning curve. Productivity increases until it reaches a
maximum bA > A, at which point learning gets exhausted. For reasons of simplicity we
assume that learning happens instantaneously. This allows us to ignore the transition
phase, so that the model boils down to a simple discrete two-period problem.
The effect of the new technology on the development of the North and the South
depends on where the new technology locates. In what follows we distinguish between
three cases: the North adopts the new technology; the South adopts the new technology;
or neither region adopts the new technology.
Case 1: the North adopts the new technology
In the case of large spillovers, which occurs with probability p, the North adopts the
new technology (since ah > A), whereas the South remains stuck in agriculture.4 The
specialization pattern has not changed; the only difference is that the North now uses
4Of course the South may also adopt the new technology if, by doing so, its workers earn higher wages,
i.e., if µ a∗ah >
1
1+α . We will assume this condition is never satisfied.
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a superior manufacturing technology. Given learning happens instantaneously, period 2
utilities for North and South are, by analogy with (16) and (17):
U2h(α) = v(
α
1 + α
bAµ) (18)
U∗2h(α) = v(
1
1 + α
bAµ) (19)
Spillovers have allowed the North to attract the new technology in spite of its higher
wages. The North reinforces its dominant position, whereas the South remains trapped in
underdevelopment.
Case 2: the South adopts the new technology
In the case of small spillovers, which occurs with probability 1−p, the North does not adopt
the new technology (since al < A). The South, however, does adopt the new technology if
its workers can earn higher wages by switching from food to the new technology. As can
be seen in Figure 1, this happens if pMa∗ > 11−µ
1
1+α , or, equivalently, if redistribution is
relatively limited:
α > Aµa∗ − 1 (20)
Once the South adopts the new technology, it starts moving up its learning curve. Since
the new technology is superior to the old technology, the South overtakes the North and the
specialization pattern reverses: the South becomes rich and industrialized, and the North
poor and agricultural.5 Assuming learning happens instantaneously, period 2 utilities in
North and South are:6
U2y(α) = v(
1
1 + α
bAµ) (21)
U∗2y(α) = v(
α
1 + α
bAµ) (22)
The new technology has located in the low-wage South, helping that region to take off
and leapfrog. This picture fits the example of Belgium, where during the 1960s the rural
North overtook the industrialized South. As the traditional heavy industries of the South
declined, new activities, such as plastics and lighter metals, located in the North, attracted
5We assume the condition for full specialization is satisfied.
6The subscript y stands for “yes, the South adopts”.
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by its low wages. This eventually led to leapfrogging: whereas in 1950 GDP per capita in
the North was still 14% lower than in the South, by 1990 it was 31% higher.
Case 3: neither region adopts the new technology
The third possibility consists of neither region adopting the new technology. As suggested
by Figure 1, this occurs when spillovers are small and when redistribution is relatively high:
α ≤ Aµa∗ − 1 (23)
In that case nothing changes; period 2 utilities in North and South coincide with period 1
utilities:7
U2n(α) = v(
α
1 + αA
µ) (24)
U∗2n(α) = v(
1
1 + αA
µ) (25)
Whether the economy is in Case 2 or in Case 3 depends on whether condition (20)
or (23) is satisfied. The degree of redistribution therefore determines whether the South
has a chance to develop and leapfrog. If redistribution is too high (Case 3), the South is
sure to remain backward; at lower levels of redistribution (Case 2), the South may take off.
This allows us to define the following two subsets of α:
Definition 1. For a given µ, a∗ and A, we define Γ as the set of α for which the South
never adopts the new technology (condition (23) holds); and we define Γc as the set of α
for which the South has a chance of adopting the new technology (condition (20) holds).
The effect of subsidies to food workers is straightforward: by raising wages in the
South, subsidies make the region less attractive for new industries, thus leading to persistent
underdevelopment. This suggests, for instance, that the European Union’s income support
system for farmers contributes to keeping poor agricultural regions poor.
Though technology adoption may be unprofitable from an individual’s point of
view, it may still be beneficial for the region. In such cases government intervention may
be called for. For instance, the North could subsidize the adoption of the new technology
by its own workers. However, we do not consider this possibility for a number of reasons.
7The subscript n stands for “no, the South does not adopt”.
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First, our model may be viewed as a reduced form of a more realistic setup where many
new technologies emerge, most of which flounder. In such an environment subsidizing
all new technologies may be too costly, whereas “picking winners” may be impossible for
informational limitations. Second, our focus is on Pareto efficient interregional transfers.
The North subsidizing its own workers to adopt the new technology does not fall into this
class of policies.
Putting the two periods together
Let β be the common discount factor for both regions. The discounted sum of expected
utility in the North depends on whether the South leapfrogs or not:
Uy(α) = U1(α) + β[pU2h(α) + (1− p)U2y(α)] (26)
Un(α) = U1(α) + β[pU2h(α) + (1− p)U2n(α)] (27)
Similarly, the discounted sum of expected utility in the South depends on whether it takes
off or not:
U∗y (α) = U∗1 (α) + β[pU∗2h(α) + (1− p)U∗2y(α)] (28)
U∗n(α) = U∗1 (α) + β[pU∗2h(α) + (1− p)U∗2n(α)] (29)
Summarizing, total expected utility in North and South can be written as:
U(α) =
½
Uy(α) if α ∈ Γc
Un(α) if α ∈ Γ
(30)
U∗(α) =
½
U∗y (α) if α ∈ Γc
U∗n(α) if α ∈ Γ
(31)
III Rational underdevelopment
High enough transfers ensure the South remains backward. We now want to show that
such transfers may be Pareto superior to any other level of transfers where the South takes
off. In other words, the South chooses to remain poor, and the North chooses to continue
paying transfers. This is what we call rational underdevelopment.
Definition 2. A redistribution policy α ∈ Γ leads to rational underdevelopment if U(α) ≥
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U(α0) and U∗(α) ≥ U∗(α0) for all α0 ∈ Γc. We denote by ΓRU the set of such redistribution
policies.
Our goal in this section is to show that the set of redistribution policies leading to
rational underdevelopment is not empty. By giving transfers, the North keeps the South
backward, thus making sure it remains in the lead. The South, on the other hand, prefers
the certainty of transfers – and relative backwardness – to the uncertainty of taking off.
In addition to risk sharing, transfers also lead to consumption smoothing: the North gives
up income in the first period for higher expected income in the second period, and the
opposite happens in the South. Although both motives cannot be neatly separated in our
particular setup, arguably risk sharing is the dominant factor. In the absence of uncertainty,
consumption smoothing would most likely occur through private capital markets. Also, it
is straightforward to show that our results would go through in the absence of consumption
smoothing. We return to this issue in the numerical section.
Figure 2 gives a graphical example of rational underdevelopment. It shows utility
in function of redistribution. For high levels of redistribution – α ∈ Γ – the South
never adopts the new technology. In that case the North wants to minimize redistribution,
whereas the South wants to maximize redistribution; this shows up in the North’s utility
increasing in α and the South’s utility decreasing in α. For low levels of redistribution –
α ∈ Γc – both the North and the South have a chance of attracting the new industry.
At the cut-off point between Γ and Γc the utility functions experience a discrete jump.
Since the North prefers the South not adopting the new technology,8 the North’s utility at
the cut-off point between Γ and Γc is such that Un(α) > Uy(α). By analogy, the opposite
happens in the South.
Rational underdevelopment occurs if there are levels of redistribution where the
South is sure to remain backward, and which are Pareto superior to any other level of
redistribution where the South has a chance of taking off. This corresponds to set ΓRU ⊂ Γ
in Figure 2: for all α ∈ ΓRU , utilities in North and South are superior to utilities associated
to any α ∈ Γc.
8We are thus assuming that the new technology’s productivity increase is not too large; Condition 2
discusses this point in further detail.
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Before analytically proving that rational underdevelopment may exist, we put some
more structure on the problem. First, for the North to have any interest in paying transfers,
it should be uncertain to attract the new technology, and it should care about this second
period uncertainty:
Condition 1. p < 1 and β > 0
Second, if the new technology’s productivity gain is too large, the North may expe-
rience welfare gains from the South switching to the new technology; although the North
would lose out on the new technology, it would be more than compensated by the decline in
the relative manufacturing price. Rational underdevelopment would not occur because the
North would prefer the South adopting the new technology to nobody adopting the new
technology. To avoid this case, we put an upper limit on the new technology’s productivity
gain:
Condition 2. ( bAA)µ < µ1−µ
Third, focusing on the range of redistribution policies for which neither region
adopts the new techology, the North’s maximum level of redistribution should be higher
than the South’s minimum level of redistribution. The North’s maximum level of redis-
tribution bα is the level above which it prefers zero transfers; the South’s minimum level
of redistribution bα∗ is the level below which it prefers zero transfers. Therefore, bα is the
solution to Un(bα) = Uy( µ1−µ); and bα∗ is the solution to U∗n(bα∗) = U∗y ( µ1−µ).9 This gives us
the third condition:
Condition 3. bα < bα∗
We do not provide the complete set of parameters which satisfy Condition 3, because that
set depends in a non-trivial way on p, µ, A, A∗, β and the specific utility function v.
It is, however, easy to see that higher risk aversion increases the demand for trans-
fers in both regions, and thus favors Condition 3. To illustrate this point, compare the cases
9 If Un(α) > Uy( µ1−µ ) for all α ∈ Γ we take bα = 1; and if U∗n(α) > U∗y ( µ1−µ ) for all α ∈ Γ we takebα∗ = Aµa∗ − 1. Likewise, if Un(α) < Uy( µ1−µ ) for all α ∈ Γ we take bα = Aµa∗ − 1; and if U∗n(α) < U∗y ( µ1−µ )
for all α ∈ Γ we take bα∗ = 1. Since Un(α) is strictly increasing and U∗n(α) is strictly decreasing bα and bα∗
are well defined.
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of no risk aversion and very high risk aversion. In the case of no risk aversion, transfers
never increase the economy’s total utility, so that they cannot make both regions better off.
One region’s gain is always the other region’s loss, so that Condition 3 is never satisfied.
As risk aversion goes up, the possibility of a “bad” outcome starts to weigh heavier in a
region’s utility: the North becomes increasingly concerned about falling behind, and the
South becomes increasingly worried about being backward. Since transfers mitigate the
“bad” outcome in both regions, at high levels of risk aversion it becomes easier to find a
set of transfer policies which are welfare improving for both North and South.
We are now ready to prove analytically that under certain conditions rational un-
derdevelopment exists:
Theorem 1. Let Conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Let all parameters but a∗ be fixed. Then,
there exists k ≤ A, such that for all a∗ ≤ k we have rational underdevelopment, i.e. the
set ΓRU is not empty.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Summing up, rational underdevelopment tends to occur if productivity gains deriving from
the new technology are modest (Condition 2); risk aversion is high (Condition 3); and the
new technology’s initial productivity in the South is low (Theorem 1). All these conditions
have been discussed before, except the last one, which has an easy interpretation: for a
low value of a∗ the South only adopts the new technology if its wages are low too. In that
case a modest transfer scheme may be enough to keep the South from attracting the new
technology.
A relevant question is whether and how our results depend on the assumption that
technological change happens only once. As already mentioned, it is straightforward to
generalize our result to an infinite-horizon overlapping generations model. This would
seems the right setup if the focus is on technological breakthroughs, which happen only
“once every generation”. If, instead, we were to think of an infinite horizon representative
agent model with technological change every period, the case for rational underdevelopment
would weaken.
Before continuing, note that one may find our example of wage subsidies too re-
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strictive. However, in a more realistic setup with an elastic labor supply and the possibility
of unemployment, many of the standard regional policy instruments would have the same
effect. Whether we are considering publicly provided goods, unemployment benefits, or
public employment, all of these policies either reduce the labor supply, or lead to an in-
crease in the reservation wage (Desmet, 2002). Either way, the equilibrium wage in the
backward region rises, without being accompanied by a productivity increase, so that the
possibility of rational underdevelopment remains. The same would be true if (lumpsum)
transfers were paid to all workers in the South, including those adopting the new technol-
ogy. The income effect would shift the labor supply schedule leftward, raising the relative
price of food, and pushing up wages.
Of course there are other regional policies, such as subsidies to infrastructure or
capital, which would not keep the South backward. However, in that case it is not clear
what the North stands to gain. Another policy alternative would be for the North to tax its
own workers who use the old technology, and thus to ensure they adopt the new technology.
However, such a policy would be clearly detrimental to the South. As already mentioned,
in this paper we limit our focus to Pareto efficient interregional transfers. In addition, the
kinds of redistributive policies we have in mind – wage subsidies, unemployment benefits,
and public employment – share another feature: they are nondiscriminatory. In the
specific case of wage subsidies, they go from rich to poor, independently of which region
is rich or poor. This seems a natural assumption in a setting where we focus on regions
within countries, rather than on different countries.10
IV Some numerical illustrations
Consider the following baseline case. Take the CRRA utility function v = x1−ρ1−ρ . Following
Mehra and Prescott (1985) we restrict values for ρ to be less than 10;11 as a starting point
we take ρ = 5. We choose GDP per capita in the rich region to be 50% higher than in the
10Beyond the realm of regional policy, it would be interesting to explore whether rich countries subsidizing
imports from poor countries would lead to a similar outcome.
11Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) claim that larger values of ρ should not be ruled out. See Campbell
(1999) for a summary of the empirical literature on the coefficient of risk aversion.
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poor region, implying µ = 0.6. This is reasonable: using data of 1996, in Italy GDP per
capita in the North was 79% higher than in the South; in Spain the East had an advantage
of 53% over the South; and in Belgium the difference was of 29% between the North and the
South (Eurostat, 2000). U.S. figures are similar: in 1998 GSP per capita in Massachusetts
stood 72% above that of Mississippi (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
We normalize A = 1 and set bA = 1.1. Comparing the South adopting the new
technology with the North adopting the new technology, these figures imply an annual
real productivity growth rate over a period of 25 years which is on average 1.6 percentage
points higher in the South. This is roughly in line with differences in TFP growth rates
across countries (Young, 1995). For the new technology’s initial productivity in the South
we take a∗ = 0.7; this implies an annual productivity increase of around 2% if the South
adopts the new technology. Following standard practice, we assume an annual real interest
rate of 4%, which leads to an annual discount factor of around 0.96. If we think of new
technologies arising once every 25 years, this gives a value for β of 0.375. Finally, for want
of a specific prior, we set the probability of the North adopting the new technology p = 0.5.
Column (6) in Table 1 gives the set of redistribution policies ΓRU consistent with
rational underdevelopment. In the baseline case rational underdevelopment occurs for
transfers that reduce the North’s relative income from 1.5 to a level ranging from 1.218 to
1.312. This corresponds to a 38% to 56% decrease in regional inequality. This reduction
in inequality is substantial, though not unusual. Estimates for Canadian provinces in the
1980s find a figure of 44% (Bayoumi and Masson, 1995).12 The two extremes of our range
of redistribution policies have an easy interpretation: 1.218 corresponds to the maximum
level of redistribution acceptable to the North; and 1.312 corresponds to the minimum level
of redistribution acceptable to the South. Column (7) in Table 1 gives the tax rates in the
North required to finance redistribution: to limit relative income to 1.218 we need a tax
rate of 8.5% in the North; to limit relative income to 1.312 that tax rate drops to 5.4%.
Transfers improve welfare for different reasons. We now analyze the relative merit
of these different motives for our benchmark case. First, transfers may provide insurance
12This is an upper bound.
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if it decreases the real income differential between the two states of nature in the second
period. In the absence of transfers, that differential is 0.212 in both the North and the
South. Taking the range of transfer levels consistent with rational underdevelopment, it
drops to between 0.032 and 0.033 in the North, and to between 0.025 and 0.026 in the
South. This implies that both regions benefit from risk sharing. Second, transfers can lead
to consumption smoothing if the difference between real income in the first period and
expected real income in the second period goes down. In the North, the absolute value of
that difference drops from 0.071 to a range between 0.016 and 0.017. In the South, it drops
from 0.129 to a range between 0.014 and 0.015. As a result, there is greater consumption
smoothing in both regions. Third, transfers may increase the discounted sum of expected
real income in one of the two regions. On that account, the South gains (with an increase
from 0.598 to a range between 0.599 and 0.625), and the North loses (with a drop from
0.799 to a range between 0.761 and 0.787).
Although three forces are at the origin of the welfare gains from transfers, arguably
risk sharing is the more important one. On the one hand, if consumption smoothing were
the main force, it is likely that private capital markets would solve the issue. Moreover,
our results go through in a world without consumption smoothing. To see this, consider a
simplified one-period version of our model. At the beginning of the period, the North and
the South decide on the level of redistribution α. Using the same parameter values as in
our benchmark case, it can be shown that we still get rational underdevelopment. On the
other hand, if transfers increase the real expected income of one region, it must come at
the expense of the other. Since consumption smoothing is not needed, and both regions
cannot benefit from higher expected income, risk sharing emerges as an essential force. Of
course, this does not imply that both regions are insuring themselves. For instance, it is
possible that the North gets insurance from the South, in exchange for an increase in the
South’s expected real income.
As a robustness check, and to gain further insight into the role of the different
parameters, we now look at some variations of the baseline case. As expected, higher risk
aversion increases the range of redistribution policies consistent with rational underdevel-
opment. Changing the discount factor has contrary effects in North and South. A smaller
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discount rate increases the relative importance of the first period, so that the North wants
less redistribution (since it is worried about insuring itself in the second period) and the
South wants more redistribution (since it is the poor region in the first period).
Table 1: Rational underdevelopment for different parameter values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Risk Discount New North Productivity Rational Tax rate
aversion factor techn. adopts South underdev’t North
ρ β bA p a∗ ΓRU [α1, α2] [ tw (α1), tw (α2)]
1. Baseline case
5 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.7 1.218, 1.312 0.085, 0.054
2. Risk aversion
9 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.7 1.128, 1.338 0.117, 0.046
3 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.7 1.284, 1.292 0.063, 0.061
2 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.7 - - - -
3. Discount factor
5 0.3 1.10 0.5 0.7 1.251, 1.324 0.074, 0.050
5 0.4 1.10 0.5 0.7 1.208, 1.309 0.088, 0.055
4. Productivity of new technology
5 0.375 1.2 0.5 0.7 1.269, 1.307 0.068, 0.056
5 0.375 1.4 0.5 0.7 - - - -
4. Probability of North adopting
5 0.375 1.10 0.6 0.7 1.251, 1.327 0.071, 0.050
5 0.375 1.10 0.4 0.7 1.181 1.299 0.097, 0.058
5. Initial productivity in South
5 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.67 1.218, 1.411 0.085, 0.025
5 0.375 1.10 0.5 0.73 1.218, 1.224 0.085, 0.083
Greater technological progress makes rational underdevelopment less likely. Ra-
tional underdevelopment occurs when the South foregoes the chance of adopting the new
technology in exchange for transfers. This stance becomes more costly for the South if
the new technology’s productivity gain is large. As suggested earlier by Condition 2, in
that case also the North becomes less likely to underwrite Southern backwardness: if pro-
ductivity gains are substantial, the North actually gains from the South adopting the new
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technology.
Not surprisingly, varying the probability of the new technology locating in the
North has an asymmetric effect on both regions. As it becomes more likely for the North
to adopt the new technology, the South wants more insurance, and the North wants less.
Finally, increasing the initial productivity of the new technology in the South limits the
possibility of rational underdevelopment; it now takes bigger transfers from the North to
convince Southern workers not to switch to the new technology.
V Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a model that explains rational underdevelopment. Fiscal
transfers raise wages in the backward region, thus reducing its chances to attract new
technologies and take off. With high enough transfers, the backward region is sure to
remain backward. If this situation is stable, we have rational underdevelopment: the
leading region pays transfers to make sure it remains in the lead, and the lagging region
accepts those transfers because it is not sure to benefit from the new technology.
Though we have focused on the specific case of wage subsidies, we have argued
that our result is much more general. Public employment, lumpsum transfers, and un-
employment benefits would all lead to similar outcomes. Of course there are other policy
instruments more likely to benefit backward regions. The European Union’s structural
funds, which subsidize infrastructure and human capital, might be an example. However,
our model suggests that such transfers may be unsustainable, because it is unclear what
the richer regions gain from such an arrangement.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
Let Ω be the set of possible redistribution schemes, i.e. Ω = [1, µ1−µ ]. In the second period
the South adopts the new technology if
α > Aµa∗ − 1
To simplify the notation we drop “∗” throughout this appendix and write a. Let α(a) ≡
A
µ a − 1. Thus the function α(a) gives the level of redistribution that makes the South in-
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different between adopting the new technology and continuing to produce exclusively food.
The set of redistributive policies for which the South does not adopt the new technology
is:
Γ(a) ≡ {α ∈ Ω : α ≤ α(a)} = [1, α(a)]
Sometimes we just write Γ. Let Γc(a) ≡ Ω/Γ(a), i.e., Γc(a) is the set of α for which
the South adopts the technology. This set is also an interval of the form
i
α(a), µ1−µ
i
.
Sometimes we write it as Γc. Recall that the expressions for the expected utilities were
given by
U(α) =
½
Uy(α) if α ∈ Γc
Un(α) if α ∈ Γ
U∗(α) =
½
U∗y (α) if α ∈ Γc
U∗n(α) if α ∈ Γ
These functions are continuous everywhere in Ω except possibly at α(a) (see Figure 2).
The strategy of the proof consists in showing that we can generate a situation similar to
the one in Figure 2.
Step 1. Un(α) is strictly increasing and U∗n(α) is strictly decreasing.
Un(α) is given by
v
µ
α
1 + αA
µ
¶
+ β
·
p v
µ
α
1 + α
bAµ¶ + (1− p) v µ α
1 + αA
µ
¶¸
which is, clearly, strictly increasing in α. U∗n(α) is given by
v
µ
1
1 + αA
µ
¶
+ β
·
p v
µ
1
1 + α
bAµ¶ + (1− p) v µ 1
1 + αA
µ
¶¸
which is, clearly, strictly decreasing in α.
Step 2. We will construct a set P ⊂ Γ of redistribution policies that are preferred by the
North to any policy in Γc. (See Figure A1).
i) For a ≡ A(1−µ)µ we have Γ(a) = [1,
1−µ
µ ], i.e., the new technology is never adopted.
ii) We have
Un
µ
µ
1− µ
¶
= u (µ Aµ) + β
h
p u
³
µ bAµ´ + (1− p)u (µ Aµ)i
and
Uy
µ
µ
1− µ
¶
= u (µ Aµ) + β
h
p u
³
µ bAµ´ + (1− p)u ³(1− µ) bAµ´i
so that Un
³
µ
1−µ
´
> Uy
³
µ
1−µ
´
iff p < 1, β > 0 and µ1−µ >
³ bA
A
´µ
. This corresponds to
Condition 1 and Condition 2, so that Un( µ1−µ) > Uy(
µ
1−µ).
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iii) By the previous two points and by continuity of Un, Uy, and α(a), there exists ea > a
close enough to a such that Un(α(ea)) > Uy(α) for all α ∈ [α(ea), µ1−µ ].
iv) Let z = maxα∈[α(ea), µ
1−µ ]
Uy(α). By continuity of Uy(α) the value z is well defined. Let
α(ea) be the solution to
z = Un(α)
and if z < Un(α) for all α ∈ Ω we set α(ea) = 1. Since Un(α) is strictly increasing α(ea) is
well defined.
Let P (ea) ≡ {α : α(ea) ≤ α ≤ α(ea)}. By construction P (ea) ⊂ Γ(ea). Moreover, P (ea)
is non-empty; to see this, it suffices to show that α(ea) < α(ea); this is immediate, given
that Un(α) is strictly increasing and given that Un(α(ea)) > Uy(α) for all α ∈ [α(ea), µ1−µ ].
It is also clear that for any α ∈ P (ea) we have Un(α) ≥ Uy(α0) for all α0 ∈ Γc(ea). Thus,
the transfer schemes in P (a) are Pareto superior for the North to the transfers schemes for
which the South adopts the new technology. Notice that the North is (weakly) better off
under α ∈ P (ea) than under zero transfers, i.e. all the policies in P (ea) are also individually
rational for the North.
Recall that bα satisfies Un(bα) = Uy( µ1−µ). It is not difficult to see that for a small
enough the value α(a) approaches µ1−µ and α(a) approaches bα (see Figure A1), i.e.:
Lim
a→
³
A(1−µ)
µ
´+ α(a) = bα
and
Lim
a→
³
A(1−µ)
µ
´+ α(a) = µ
1− µ
The idea is simple, when a approaches (from right) its lowest possible value, the South
almost never adopts the new technology and the set P (a) approaches the set of all α0s such
that Un(α) > Uy( µ1−µ), and the lower bound of this set is bα and the upper bound is µ1−µ .
Given that bα < α(ea) and µ1−µ > α(ea), and given that P (ea) is non empty, it is clear that
for a small enough, P (a) is non empty.
Step 3. We will construct, in a parallel way to what we did in Step 2 for the North, a
set P ∗ ⊂ Γ of redistribution policies that are preferred by the South to any policy in Γc.
(See Figure A2).
i) Condition 3 implies that U∗n(1) > U∗y ( µ1−µ) . Step 1 showed that U∗n(α) is strictly
decreasing in α. Hence, and by continuity of U∗n, U∗y , and α(a), there exists a0 > a ≡
A(1−µ)
µ
close enough to a such that U∗n(1) > U∗y (α) for all α ∈ [α(a0), µ1−µ ].
ii) Let z = maxα∈[α(a0), µ
1−µ ]
U∗y (α). By continuity of U∗y (α) the value z is well defined. Let
α(a0) be the solution to
z = U∗n(α)
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Since U∗n(α(a0)) < U∗y (α(a0)), since U∗n(α) is strictly decreasing, and since U∗n(1) > z, we
can conclude that α(a0) is well defined.
Let P ∗(a0) ≡ {α : 1 ≤ α ≤ α(a0)}. By construction P ∗(a0) ⊆ Γ(a0). Moreover,
P ∗(a0) is non empty; to see this, it suffices to show that α(a0) < 1; this is immediate, given
that z < U∗n(1). It is also clear that for any α ∈ P ∗(a0) we have U∗n(α) ≥ U∗y (α0) for all
α0 ∈ Γc(a0). Thus, the transfer schemes in P ∗(a) are Pareto superior for the South to the
transfers schemes for which the South adopts the new technology. Notice that the South is
(weakly) better off under α ∈ P ∗(a0) than under zero transfers, i.e. all the policies in P (a0)
are also individually rational for the South. Recall that bα∗ satisfies U∗n(bα∗) = U∗y ( µ1−µ).
It is not difficult to see that for a small enough the value α(a) approaches µ1−µ and α(a)
approaches to bα∗ (see Figure A2), i.e.:
Lim
a→
³
A(1−µ)
µ
´+ α(a) = bα∗
Given that bα∗ > α(a0) and given that P ∗(a0) is non empty, it is clear that for a small
enough the set P ∗ (a) is non empty.
Step 4 We want to show that for a small enough the set R(a) ≡ P (a) ∩ P ∗(a) is not
empty. Remember that P (a) is given by the interval [α(a), α(a)] and P ∗(a) is given by the
interval [1, α(a)] , and for a small enough those intervals are not empty: We showed that
Lim
a→
³
A(1−µ)
µ
´+ α(a) = bα and Lim
a→
³
A(1−µ)
µ
´+ α(a) = bα∗. Thus, for a small enough,
R(a) is not empty if bα < bα∗ , and this inequality is just Condition 3. Since R(a) ⊆ ΓRU (a)
we have that, for a small enough, ΓRU (a) is not empty, and this concludes the proof.
References
[1] Akerlof, G.A., Rose, A.K., Yellen, J.L., Hessenius, H., Dornbusch, R. and Guitian, M.
(1991), East Germany in from the Cold: The Economic Aftermath of Currency
Union, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1991, 1-105.
[2] Alesina, A., Danninger, S. and Rostagno, M.V. (1999), Redistribution through Public
Employment: the Case of Italy, NBER Working Paper 7387.
[3] Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1998), Economic Risk and Political Risk in Fiscal Unions,
Economic Journal 108, 989-1009.
[4] Bayoumi, T. and Masson, P.R. (1995), Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada:
Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe, European Economic Review 39, 253-74.
[5] Boltho, A., Carlin, W., and Scaramozzino, P. (1997), Will East Germany Become a
New Mezzogiorno?, Journal of Comparative Economics 24, 241-264.
24
[6] Bolton, P. and Roland, G. (1997), The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy
Analysis, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 1057-1090.
[7] Brezis, E.S., Krugman, P.R., and Tsiddon, D. (1993), Leapfrogging in International
Competition: A Theory of Cycles in National Technological Leadership, American
Economic Review 83, 1211-1219.
[8] Brunello, G., Lupi, C. and Ordine, P. (2001), Widening Differences in Italian Regional
Unemployment, Labour Economics 8, 103-129.
[9] Campbell, J.Y. (1999), Asset Prices, Consumption, and the Business Cycle, in J.B.
Taylor et al. (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics 1c, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[10] Desmet, K. (2002), A Simple Dynamic Model of Uneven Development and Overtaking,
Economic Journal 112, 894-918.
[11] Eurostat (2000), Regions: Statistical Yearbook 1999, Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities, Luxembourg.
[12] Faini, R. (1993), Stesso Lavoro Diverso Salario?, in F. Galimberti et al,. (eds.), Nuove
Frontiere della Politica Economica, Il Sole 24 Ore, Milan.
[13] Kandel, S. and Stambaugh, R.F. (1991), Asset Returns and Intertemporal Preferences,
Journal of Monetary Economics 27, 39-71.
[14] Krugman, P. (1987), The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Compet-
itive Consequences of Mrs. Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic
Scale Economies, Journal of Development Economics 27, 41-55.
[15] Leontieff, W. (1936), Note on the Pure Theory of Capital Transfer, in Explorations
in Economics: Notes and Essays Contributed in Honor of F.W. Taussig, McGraw
Hill, New York.
[16] Matsuyama, K. (1992), Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Eco-
nomic Growth, Journal of Economic Theory 58, 317-334.
[17] Mehra, R. and Prescott, E.C. (1985), The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, Journal of
Monetary Economics 15, 145-61.
[18] Myers, G.M. (1990), Optimality, Free Mobility, and the Regional Authority in a Fed-
eration, Journal of Public Economics 43, 107-121.
[19] Paci, R. and Sabo, A. (1998), The Empirics of Regional Economic Growth in Italy,
1951-1993, Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali 45, 515-
542.
[20] Padoa Schioppa, F.K. and Basile, R. (2002), Unemployment Dynamics of the ‘Mezzo-
giornos of Europe’: Lessons for the Mezzogiorno of Italy, CEPR Discussion Paper
3594.
25
[21] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1996a), Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and
Moral Hazard, Econometrica 64, 623-646.
[22] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1996b), Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and
Redistribution, Journal of Political Economy 104, 979-1009.
[23] Sinn, G. and Sinn, H-W. (1992), Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
[24] Sinn, H-W. (2000), Germany’s Economic Unification: An Assessment after Ten Years,
NBER Working Paper 7586.
[25] Sinn, H-W. and Westermann, F. (2001), Two Mezzogiornos, NBER Working Paper
8125.
[26] Wildasin, D.E. (1994), Income Redistribution and Migration, Canadian Journal of
Economics 27, 637-656.
26
¡
¡
¡
¡
¡
¡µ
@
@
@
@
@
@R¡
¡
¡
¡
¡
¡
¡
¡µ
@
@
@
@
@
@
@
@R
p
North adopts: (U2h, U∗2h)
(Large spillovers)
1− p
(Small spillovers)
α > Aµa∗ − 1
South adopts: (U2y, U∗2y)
α ≤ Aµa∗ − 1
Nobody adopts: (U2n, U∗2n)
Figure 1: Adoption of new technology.
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Figure A2: Policies preferred by the South
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